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1 Introduction
Capital flight remains one of the enigmatic policy and academic issues of the day.
Although from the end of the 1980s and early 1990s the debt crisis appeared to be
contained and attention to the capital flight phenomenon waned, capital flight still
remains a serious problem in a number of countries. The most pronounced concern
among policymakers, researchers and the key stakeholders in economic development is
that in most developing countries which are riddled with heavy debt burdens, foreign
exchange shortages, transient and chronic poverty, capital flight amounts to a
substantial proportion of the very resources which are essential for financing economic
growth and reversing the perverse economic trends.1
Most of the initial empirical studies on capital flight focused on Latin American
economies. Capital flight from Latin America during the 1970s and early 1980s
appeared to be voluminous in absolute terms. The sheer volume posed a threat to the
viability of the domestic banking system, national solvency and economic stability. In
addition, the flight of capital occurred at the same time that the countries were in
desperate need for foreign exchange to amortize their outstanding debt to commercial
banks in industrial countries. Later studies showed that capital flight was also an
important issue for countries in other developing regions, however.
During the early 1990s the interest for the capital flight phenomenon waned, since most
Latin American countries had reduced their external debt problems and capital started to
flow back to many of the emerging economies in this region, as well as to East Asia.
Yet, from the mid-1990s the international financial system was confronted with the
outbreak of several major financial and economic crises. These crises contributed to
large outflows of capital from several developing countries and led to renewed attention
to the capital flight phenomenon. First, in 1994-95, Mexico and some Latin American
countries experienced the Tequila crisis. Then, in 1997-98, several Asian countries
experienced a deep financial and economic crisis, followed by Russia in 1998 and
Brazil in 1999. These financial crises added an important dimension to the capital flight
problem. For example, the mounting complexity of imbalances in the underlying
economic fundamentals in the Asian economies culminated into a scenario of collapsing
exchange rates and share prices, initially in Thailand and Indonesia, which provoked
domestic and international investors to immediately withdraw their money, and thereby
caused panic on the international financial markets. There were even fears of bank runs
which, due to bandwagon and contagion effects, threatened the stability of the
international banking system. In this context, the Asian financial crisis demonstrated
how adverse domestic economic conditions influence the behaviour of domestic and
international investors in accelerating capital flight.
This paper aims to examine the key aspects of capital flight and highlight the prospects
for reversing the flight of capital from developing countries. Several definitions of the
term capital flight are isolated; it is shown that each definition offers an associated
approach for measuring the magnitude of capital flight. Moreover, the paper discusses
                                                
1 The media has constantly spotlighted the capital flight phenomenon, remarkably arguing that precious
resources from poor countries are being used to finance the egoistic consumerist habits of the world’s
richest people. For example, a respected Financial Times journalist, Martin Wolf, has argued that one
of the most likely sources of unrecorded funding for the United States colossal US$392 billion current
account deficit is capital flight from poor countries (see Financial Times 2002).2
the main determinants of capital flight, including variables that capture bank
intermediation behaviour, political risk and policy uncertainty. One of the important
conclusions of the paper is that good policies may help reverse capital flight.
The remainder of this paper is structured into four parts. Section 2 provides an overview
of the definition of capital flight and the main methods used to measure capital flight.
The magnitude of capital flight is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 presents an overview
of the theoretical and empirical literature on the determinants of capital flight. Section 5
concludes and proposes policy measures that may help to reverse capital flight.
2 The measurement of capital flight
In the literature there is no consensus about the definition of capital flight. Several
studies suggest capital flight should be distinguished from normal capital outflows.
According to these studies, normal outflows are based on considerations of portfolio
diversification of residents—for example, in terms of portfolio or direct investment and
trade credit—and/or activities of domestic commercial banks aiming at acquiring or
extending foreign deposit holdings. In their view, the phenomenon of capital flight is
somehow related to the existence of extremely high uncertainty and risk with respect to
returns on domestically held assets. Residents take their money and run in order to
avoid extremely high losses on their domestic asset holdings. Authors like Deppler and
Williamson (1987) argue that capital flight is motivated by the fear of losing wealth due
to, for example, expropriation of wealth by the government, sudden exchange rate
depreciation, non-repayment of government debts, (changes in) capital controls and
financial market regulations, and (changes in) tax policies. Walter (1987) and
Kindleberger (1987) have a similar opinion. These authors suggest that capital flight
should be related to the abnormal or illegal nature of certain capital outflows. Yet, in
practice it is extremely difficult to empirically distinguish between normal and
abnormal or illegal capital outflows (see also Gordon and Levine 1989). Therefore,
several authors argue that capital flight should not be distinguished from normal capital
outflows (see, for example, Erbe 1985; World Bank 1985; Morgan Guaranty 1986 and
1988). It is argued that for countries struggling with (large) current account deficits and
external debt payments—and which are thus in need of foreign capital—any capital
outflow increases the problems of financing their net imports and debt payments.
The measurement of capital flight is not straightforward, given that there is no
consensus on the definition of capital flight. Indeed, several capital flight measures are
available in the literature. Not surprisingly, this leads to differences in capital flight
estimates for different countries. In general, the following measures of capital flight can
be distinguished in the literature (Claessens and Naudé 1993: 2-9): (i) the residual (or
broad) method; (ii) the Dooley method; (iii) the hot money method; (iv) the trade
misinvoicing method; and (v) the asset method. Below, we will briefly describe these
different methods of measurement.
2.1 The residual method
This method measures capital flight indirectly by comparing the sources of capital
inflows (i.e., net increases in external debt and the net inflow of foreign investment)3
with the uses of these inflows (i.e., the current account deficit and additions to foreign
reserves). This approach starts from the standard balance of payments framework. In
principle, if the balance of payments statistics were to be used (reported by the
International Monetary Fund Balance of Payments Statistics), the uses and sources of
funds should be equal. However, since these statistics may not accurately measure
flows, and in particular private capital flows, World Bank statistics on the change in the
external debt are used instead. If the sources, calculated by using World Bank debt data,
exceed the uses of capital inflows, the difference is termed as capital flight. The residual
method acknowledges the difficulties of separating abnormal from normal capital
outflows and, therefore, measures all unrecorded private capital outflows as being
capital flight.
According to the residual method, capital flight is calculated as follows:
KFr = ∆ED + FI – CAD – ∆FR (1)
where KFr is capital flight according to the residual method, ∆ denotes change, ED is
stock of gross external debt reported in the World Bank data, FI is the net foreign
investment inflows, CAD is the current account deficit and FR is the stock of official
foreign reserves.
In the literature, the residual method has been widely used, in some cases with (minor)
modifications. The standard approach as described above has been used by, among
others, the World Bank (1985) and Erbe (1985). Morgan Guaranty (1986) takes into
account an additional item, i.e. the change in the short-term foreign assets of the
domestic banking system (∆B). This modification is introduced to focus on non-bank
capital flight. Thus, capital flight according to the Morgan Guaranty variant of the
residual method (KFm) can be calculated as:
KFm = ∆ED + FI – CAD – ∆FR – ∆B (2)
Cline (1986; cited in Cumby and Levich 1987) also uses the residual method, but
proposes to exclude the following items from the current account balances: travel
(credit), reinvested earnings on direct investment abroad, reinvested earnings on direct
investment domestically, and other investment income (credit). He argues that income
from tourism, border transactions, and reinvested investment income should not be
considered capital flight since these earnings are beyond the control of the authorities
(Cumby and Levich 1987: 33-4). Claessens and Naudé (1993), in contrast to most
others, take into account net acquisitions of corporate equities in their measure of
foreign direct investment. Zedillo (1987) argues that the standard residual method
should be modified with respect to the measurement of external debt and the current
account deficit. First, instead of measuring changes in the stock of external debt, Zedillo
proposes to look at flows, since this may more accurately report annual capital flows.
Second, he proposes to adjust the current account for interest earned and retained
abroad. This is estimated by taking the interest on identified deposits of residents held
abroad. Brown (1990) and Vos (1992) propose to take into account the unrecorded
remittances of workers abroad. These remittances tend to be understated in the balance
of payments statistics of developing countries, leading to an overstatement of the
current account deficits. This would then result in lower estimates of capital flight.
Remittances of workers abroad are important sources of foreign exchange for several
developing countries, including Egypt, Sudan and the Philippines. Finally, Morgan4
Guaranty (1988), Pastor (1990), Boyce and Ndikumana (2001) and Ndikumana and
Boyce (2002) add interest earnings on the stock of assets held abroad, taking a
representative international market interest rate to compute these earnings. This, of
course, increases the estimates of capital flight based on the residual method.
2.2  The Dooley method
This method aims at distinguishing normal from abnormal, or illegal capital flows.
Dooley (1986) sees capital flight as the total amount of externally held assets of the
private sector that do not generate income recorded in the balance of payments statistics
of a country. Or, stated otherwise, capital flight is all capital outflows based on the
desire to place wealth beyond the control of the domestic authorities. The Dooley
method of measuring capital flight starts by computing total capital outflows as reported
in the balance of payments statistics, but then makes a number of modifications. First,
errors and omissions are taken into account to measure total capital outflows. Second,
the Dooley method takes into account the difference between the World Bank data on
the change in the stock of external debt and the amount of external borrowing as
reported in the balance of payments statistics. If the first is larger than the second, this
difference is assumed to be part of capital flight. Third, the stock of external assets is
computed that correspond to the reported interest rate earnings in the balance of
payments by using a representative market interest rate (i.e. the US deposit rate). The
difference between total capital outflows and the change in the stock of external assets
corresponding to reported interest income is measured as capital flight.
According to the Dooley method, capital flight is measured as follows. First, the amount
of total capital outflows is calculated:
TKO = FB + FI – CAD – ∆FR – EO – ∆WBIMF  (3)
where TKO is total capital outflows, FB is foreign borrowing as reported in the balance
of payments statistics, EO is net errors and omissions (debit entry), and WBIMF is the
difference between the change in the stock of external debt reported by the World Bank
and foreign borrowing reported in the balance of payments statistics published by the
IMF.
The stock of external assets corresponding to reported interest earnings is:
ES = INTEAR / rus  (4)
where ES is external assets, rus is the US deposit rate (assumed to be a representative
international market interest rate), and INTEAR is reported interest earnings. Capital
flight according to the Dooley method is then measured as:
KFd = TKO – ∆ES  (5)
The Dooley method is conceptually different from the residual method. Yet, Claessens
and Naudé (1993: 5-7) show that in practice capital flight measured according to the
Dooley method and the residual method are fairly similar, since most of the data used
for calculation are the same in both cases.5
2.3  The hot money method
According to this method capital flight is measured by adding up net errors and
omissions and non-bank private short-term capital outflows. Cuddington (1986 1987),
Ketkar and Ketkar (1989) and Gibson and Tsakalotos (1993) are examples of authors
who have used this method of measuring capital flight. Like the Dooley method, this
method corresponds to the idea that capital flight goes unrecorded, due to the illegal
nature of these capital movements. The unrecorded capital movements are believed to
appear in net errors and omissions. Moreover, by concentrating on short-term flows,
medium and long-term outflows are excluded, which are viewed as being normal in
character (Gibson and Tsakalotos 1993: 146). Thus, the hot money method (KFh) can be
calculated as follows:
KFh = SKO + EO  (6)
where SKO is the total amount of short-term capital outflows.
2.4  The trade misinvoicing method
Some authors use the amount of trade misinvoicing as a measure of capital flight
(Claessens and Naudé 1993). Trade misinvoicing is determined by comparing trade data
from both the importing and exporting country. Importers are assumed to be involved in
capital flight when they report higher values of imported goods as compared to the
reported value of the same goods by exporters. In turn, exporters are involved in capital
flight when they report lower values of exported goods as compared to the reported
value of the same goods by importers. Proponents of this measure stress the fact that
abnormal capital outflows of residents may be included in export underinvoicing and/or
import overinvoicing, since both these malpractices provide channels to siphon
domestically accumulated wealth outside the country. In some cases, those authors
using the residual method argue that the measurement of capital flight in this way is
inaccurate due to the poor quality of export and import figures resulting from trade
misinvoicing. They, therefore, propose to adjust capital flight figures based on the
residual method (Gulati 1987; Lessard and Williamson 1987; Vos 1992; Eggerstedt
et al. 1995; Ajayi 1997; Boyce 1993; Ndikumana and Boyce 2002; and Collier et al.
2001).
2.5  The asset method
Some authors take the total stock of assets of non-bank residents held at foreign banks
as a measure of capital flight. This is the so-called asset method (Hermes and Lensink
1992; Collier et al. 2001). The asset method is a short-cut measure of capital flight. This
measure may be seen as an indication of the minimum amount of assets held abroad,
since residents may hold their assets in other forms next to bank accounts, for example,
in foreign equity holdings. The IMF provided data on these bank assets until 1994. For
recent years, however, no information is available to apply this measure.6
2.6 The methods and their drawbacks
The methods discussed above have important drawbacks. In our view, the Dooley
method and hot money method are conceptually wrong. We would argue that the
distinction between normal and abnormal or illegal capital outflows is not useful. What
really matters is that a country confronted with a lack of financial resources to finance
long-term development experiences an adverse impact on its future growth prospects
when net capital outflows occur. With respect to the hot money it may be added that it is
unclear why capital flight should consist of short-term capital movements only. Assets
of residents held outside the home country based on a longer-term perspective should
also be part of capital flight. The asset method may suffer from being too narrow a
measure of total capital flight and may leave out potentially large parts of capital flight.
Moreover, assets held at foreign banks are not always specified by ownership. Taking
into account the inaccuracy of trade data due to misinvoicing may help to improve
capital flight estimates. Yet, it has been argued that trade misinvoicing may also occur
in the presence of trade taxes. Calculated trade misinvoicing may then be unrelated to
the phenomenon of capital flight (Gibson and Tsakalotos 1993: 150). Moreover, Chang
and Cumby (1991: 167) in a study on the magnitude of capital flight in Sub-Saharan
Africa point out that ‘… the systemic underreporting of trade figures in both directions
to avoid trade barriers … seems to overwhelm any discernible capital flight through
misinvoicing.’ Since many developing countries make use of some form of trade
barriers, we have every reason to assume that this finding will also apply in the case of
other developing countries.
Taking into account the above mentioned drawbacks of the different methods of
calculating capital flight,  we would favour the use of the residual method when
measuring capital flight.
3 The magnitude of capital flight
We estimate the magnitude of capital flight for four regions, namely East Asia, South
Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, for the period 1983-98. The estimates are
based on the residual measure: change in debt + net foreign investment—(current
account deficit + change in reserves). Only countries for which data were available for
the entire sample period have been included in the estimations (see note to Table 1 for
the complete list of countries on which we report capital flight data). We also report
data on the ‘burden’ of capital flight, measured by the ratio of capital flight to national
income. The data are described and reported in Table 1.
When looking at the figures presented in Table 1, we may conclude the following about
the absolute and relative size of capital flight from the countries in our sample:
−   For East Asia, capital flight in absolute terms was most intense during the period
1990-93. The region also experienced the highest levels of capital flight as
compared to the other developing regions, especially towards the end of the
1990s. The burden of capital flight was most severe in 1998, when total flows of
capital flight amounted to 12 per cent of GDP of the countries in the sample.7
−   For South Asia the Table shows a mixed picture of capital flight as well as its
reversal. Generally speaking, for this region capital flight has been rather modest
as compared to East Asia, in absolute as well as in relative terms (relative to
GDP). The highest flight of capital relative to GDP was experienced in 1993 and
1994, when it amounted to 2 to 4 per cent. Yet, in the year thereafter the reversal
of capital flight was over 3 per cent and the reversal continued until 1998 when
the Asian financial crisis broke out, leading to a flight of capital that amounted to
1.5 per cent of GDP.
−   According to the figures in Table the Sub-Saharan African countries included in
our analysis experienced a high burden of capital flight. While in absolute terms
capital flight from these countries was low during the entire period as compared to
other regions, it was very high relative to GDP, especially during 1985-87
(between 11 and 12 per cent) and 1990 (8 per cent). The Sub-Saharan African
countries seem not to have been affected by the Asian crisis in 1997-98: capital
flight was low in 1998 and in 1997 the table even reports capital reversal for these
countries.
−   The Latin American countries in our sample have experienced high levels of
capital flight, at least in absolute terms, especially during the period 1990-98.
However, the capital flight burden is not as high as in the East Asian or
Sub-Saharan African region. Then highest burden is reported for 1984 and 1996,
when capital flight amounted to almost 4 and 5 per cent of GDP, respectively, of
the countries in the sample.
Table 1
Magnitude and burden of capital flight: flows for 1983-98

















1983 5 1.1 5 1.7 -0.9 -2.4 4 0.9
1984 7 1.3 0.2 0.1 0.5 1.3 17 3.9
1985 3 0.5 3 0.8 5 11.4 9 2.0
1986 10 1.9 5 1.6 5 10.8 -8 -1.5
1987 37 6.4 6 1.7 6 12.1 15 2.8
1988 33 4.8 -4 -1.2 -2 -3.1 -3 -0.5
1989 17 2.2 8 2.1 2 4.4 5 0.8
1990 50 5.8 -0.1 -0.03 4 8.1 26 3.5
1991 51 5.4 7 2.0 1 2.3 19 2.5
1992 42 4.1 5 1.3 -0.4 -0.8 40 4.9
1993 46 4.1 10 2.7 -0.1 -0.3 16 1.8
1994 140 10.5 17 4.0 2 5.2 30 2.9
1995 113 6.9 -16 -3.3 4 6.9 28 2.3
1996 102 5.6 -6 -1.2 0.7 1.3 52 3.9
1997 103 5.6 -4 -0.7 -3 -5.6 33 2.3
1998 189 12.2 8 1.5 0.4 0.6 24 1.7
Notes: The table shows data for capital flight based on the residual measure (change in debt + net
foreign investment - (current account deficit + change in reserves)). Data are taken from World
Bank (2002). Change in reserves refers to: BN.RES.INCL.CD - Changes in net reserves (BoP,
current US$).
Debt refers to: DT.DOD.DECT.CD - External debt, total (DOD, current US$).
Current account refers to: BN.CAB.XOKA.CD - Current account balance (BoP, current US$).8
Notes to Table 1 (con’t)
Net foreign direct investment refers to BN.KLT.DINV.CD - Foreign direct investment, net (BoP,
current US$).
GDP refers to NY.GDP.MKTP.KD - GDP at market prices in US$.
Only countries for which data were available for the entire sample period are included. The
countries included in the sample are the following:
East Asia: China, Fiji, Indonesia, Korea, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Solomon
Islands and Thailand.
South Asia: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
Sub-Saharan Africa: Botswana, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Mozambique, Swaziland and Uganda.
Latin America: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Venezuela.
Data on capital flight of individual countries are available in Appendix Table A-1.
Table 2
Stocks of capital flight, end of 1998
Capital flight (US$ bn) Capital flight to GDP in 1998
Latin America 309 22.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 25 41.3
South Asia 43 7.8
East Asia 947 60.9
Note: Stocks are found by adding up annual flows for 1983-98. See also note to Table 1.
Next to providing data on the flows of capital flight, we also report stocks of capital
flight over the 1983-98 period. Table 2 shows that the East Asian countries in our
sample have by far the highest stock of capital flight, amounting to 60 per cent of GDP
in 1998. An important source of the high level of the stock has been the Asian crisis; as
reported in Table 1, during 1998, the total stock of capital flight increased by 20 per
cent for this region. Also for the Sub-Saharan African countries we report high stocks
(40 per cent of GDP). The stocks are relatively low for the countries in South Asia
(almost 8 per cent of GDP).
These figures show that there may be potentially large resources available for
development financing if countries are able to conduct policies that contribute to the
reversal of capital flight.
4 The determinants of capital flight2
Stated in a formal way, capital flight is directly related to the behaviour of a risk-averse
individual who diversifies his wealth in order to maximize asset returns. This
emphasizes the decision to hold assets abroad as part of the process of portfolio
diversification (Cuddington 1986; Gibson and Tsakalotos 1993; Lensink et al. 1998).
Differences in rates of return between domestic and foreign asset holdings, the amount
of wealth, and risk and uncertainty aspects influence this decision. The following main
determinants of capital flight are discussed here: (i) macroeconomic instability; (ii)
                                                
2 This section draws from Hermes et al. (2002).9
political instability; (iii) rate of return differentials; (iv) capital inflows; (v) stock of capital
flight; and (vi) public policy uncertainty. These determinants have a direct influence on
portfolio decisions of individuals. As will be shown, in a number of cases the determinants
are closely connected.
4.1 Macroeconomic instability
Macroeconomic instability occurs when aggregate domestic demand exceeds aggregate
domestic supply on a structural basis. The causes of this instability may be manifold, for
example, political tensions and instability, wrong or lacking incentive structures and
institutions to let markets efficiently coordinate demand and supply, and heavy
government involvement, which may put markets at the sideline. Whatever the exact
reasons, when a country experiences macroeconomic instability this may become
manifest in a number of ways: budget deficits will rise, current account deficits
increase, exchange rate overvaluation occurs and inflation is growing. Variables
describing such factors are often found in studies on the determinants of capital flight.
Exchange rate overvaluation is often found to be an important variable in studies of
capital flight and its underlying determinants. An overvalued exchange rate leads to
increasing expectations of depreciation in the near future. This in turn will lead to rising
prices of foreign goods relative to those of domestic goods and thus to loss of real
income. To avoid welfare losses, residents hold at least part of their assets abroad. High
inflation directly erodes the real value of domestic assets, stimulating residents to hold
assets outside the country. Moreover, inflation rates and the exchange rate are closely
connected, since high inflation may lead to increasing expectations of depreciation in
the future. High current account deficits may have a similar impact on exchange rate
expectations, and may thus be a stimulus for capital flight. Government budget deficit
may stimulate capital flight, since it raises expectations of residents with respect to
future tax increases or increases in inflation tax, since it is anticipated that the
government needs to repay its debt. In both cases, the real value of domestic assets is
eroded, leading to capital flight.
In all the cases discussed here, macroeconomic instability leads to (indirectly)
increasing taxes and tax-like distortions. This will lower returns and increase risk and
uncertainty of domestically held wealth (Collier et al. 2001). This will increase
incentives for capital flight. The large outflows of capital at the beginning of the debt
crisis in the early 1980s and at the outbreak of the Asian crisis in 1997-98 support this
view. The macroeconomic situation of these countries was highly unstable during these
years.
4.2 Political instability
Whereas macroeconomic instability variables focus on the outcomes of public policies
and their impact on capital flight, one may also look at the institutional context in which
these policies have been carried out. The institutional context itself may give rise to
capital flight. Public sector behaviour may have an impact on the risks and uncertainty
regarding the policy environment and its outcomes More specifically, residents may
decide to hold their assets abroad based on lack of confidence in the domestic political
situation, perceived high levels of corruption, and the consequences of these factors for10
the future value of the assets. In these cases, perceived political instability may generate
capital flight. Models that illustrate the impact of political instability on capital flight
can be found in Alesina and Tabellini (1989), Tornell and Velasco (1992), and
Bhattacharya (1999). It is shown that when different governments with different interest
groups supporting them come into office, uncertainty increases with respect to future
fiscal policies. Such an unstable political situation may, for example, lead to a political
business cycle. Political instability may also turn into political unrest, leading to strikes,
riots, assassinations, etc. Finally, different forms of the regime type (democracy,
autocracy, etc.) may have a different impact on the degree of uncertainty about future
policy and their outcomes.
Political instability may thus have an influence on the possibility that the government
may in one way or another erode the future value of asset holdings. The erosion of
future wealth is based on the expectation that domestic political instability causes rising
macroeconomic instability, leading to rising budget deficits, current account deficits,
exchange rate uncertainty and high inflation. Several studies on the determinants of
capital flight take into account one or more variables that measure the degree of political
uncertainty.
4.3 Rate of return differentials
Of course, capital flight may occur simply because the returns on assets are higher
abroad as compared to assets held domestically. Most studies on the determinants of
capital flight take this into account by adding a variable that measures the (after tax) real
interest rate differential.
4.4 Capital inflows
Several authors specifically emphasize the role played by foreign borrowing as a
determinant of capital flight. The explanations for the relationship between foreign
borrowing and capital flight are related to the issues discussed earlier with respect to
macroeconomic and political instability. In the literature several models deal with the
issue of the simultaneous occurrence of capital flight and capital inflows. Moreover, as
we will show below, most empirical studies emphasize the role played by capital
inflows in explaining capital flight.
Especially during the 1970s and early 1980s, developing countries experienced massive
capital inflows and outflows at the same time. Eaton (1987) presents a theoretical model
in which he explains why the increase of foreign borrowing may stimulate capital flight.
According to the model, residents may borrow on international capital markets and then
use the loans (plus potential domestically held assets) to buy foreign assets. This is
advantageous if they expect their government to nationalize debt repayments at some
point in time, which will release them from the obligation to repay, and if domestic
taxes are high. These expectations reflect moral hazard behaviour of residents, who
expect to be bailed out by their government. In the early 1980s the moral hazard
behaviour of domestic borrowers was indeed rewarded when governments of several
developing countries actually nationalized foreign debt repayments.11
Under the above mentioned assumptions, current foreign borrowing increases future
repayment obligations of the government when it actually nationalizes debt repayments.
If residents perceive that the government will pass the costs of these repayments on
them, for example by using the inflation tax, they may choose to convert their domestic
assets into foreign assets. Boyce (1992 and 1993) and Ndikumana and Boyce (2002)
refer to this as the ‘revolving door syndrome’. Moreover, the occurrence of capital flight
itself stimulates others to hold money abroad, since now the future costs of debt
repayment by the government have to be shared by a decreasing number of wealth
holders. Similar models by Eaton and Gersovitz (1989) and Ize and Ortiz (1987) show
that capital flight is stimulated when the public sector itself borrows in the international
capital markets to finance its current expenditures. Fry (1993) stresses that growing
government guaranteed foreign debt may increase expectations about exchange rate
devaluations, which provides a stimulus to hold foreign assets.
Other authors stress the importance of differences in perceived risk of investing in the
domestic economy to explain the simultaneous inflow and outflow of capital (Khan and
Ul Haque 1985; Dooley 1988; Diwan 1989). Residents face a higher risk of a reduction
in the value of their domestically held assets as compared to foreign investors. This may
lead to a situation where domestic investors buy foreign assets while foreign investors
buy domestic assets at the same time. Unlike domestic investors, foreign investors are
not hurt by the inflation tax, since they lend in foreign currency. A similar asymmetry in
perceived risks holds with respect to currency depreciation following the accumulation
of debt obligations. Domestic investors will experience a reduction of the real value of
their assets, whereas foreign investors are not hurt by such exchange rate changes.
It has also been argued that in practice the domestic debt obligations of the government
are junior to foreign debt obligations (Ize and Ortiz 1987; Kant 1996), which reduces
the willingness of residents to lend to their own government. Foreigners, instead, are not
reluctant to lend to the government due to the seniority of their claims.
Razin and Sadka (1991), Dooley and Kletzer (1994) and Bjerksund and Schjelderup
(1995) present models that emphasize differences in tax treatments for domestic and
foreign investors, leading to simultaneous capital inflows and capital outflows.
Finally, simultaneous capital inflow and outflow may also be due to asymmetric
information about expected returns on domestic assets between domestic and foreign
investors.
4.5 The stock of capital flight
Another determinant of capital flight is the stock of capital flight itself. The argument to
take the stock of capital flight as a determinant of the flows of capital flight stresses the
spillover effect of large assets holdings abroad on the expected losses on domestically
held assets. When residents hold large amounts of foreign assets, the tax base is reduced
considerably. Under these circumstances, the tax burden due to increased public
expenditures and foreign borrowing has to be shared by a smaller tax base, increasing
the burden per unit of domestically held asset. Consequently, this will further stimulate
residents to take their money and run. Thus, the larger the stock of capital flight, the
higher the incentives to flee (Collier et al. 2001). An entirely different argument to take
the capital flight stock as a determinant is given by Vos (1992). He argues that the stock12
of capital flight reflects the desire of residents to hold foreign assets to satisfy their
foreign consumption needs. In this spirit, flows of capital flight may reflect residents’
behaviour in targeting a certain stock of foreign asset holdings.
4.6 Public policy uncertainty
As discussed above, public policy behaviour may be one of the main determinants and is
related to both macroeconomic and political instability. If the content and direction of
current and future public policies are uncertain and/or unstable, domestic investors will
be uncertain about the impact of these policies on the real value of domestically held
assets in the future. This uncertainty may stimulate investors to sell their domestic and
buy foreign assets. One example of a theoretical analysis of policy uncertainty and its
influence on capital flight is found in Sheets (1995). Sheets argues that the shock therapy
implemented by some transition economies led to substantial capital flight, since the policy
reforms initially generated increased uncertainty about policies and their outcomes.
4.7 Evaluating empirical studies of the determinants of capital flight
A large number of studies is available in which the determinants of capital flight are
analysed empirically. Table 3 provides an overview of these studies, specifying the
measure of capital flight used, the determinants of capital flight, the countries or regions
of which data have been used, the sample period, and the estimation technique. The
summary presented below will focus on discussing some of the most interesting features
and findings of these studies. Due to limitations of space we cannot discuss the studies
in detail. The interested reader is referred to the original articles.
Starting with the measure of capital flight used, the summary in Table 3 makes clear
that most studies use a version of the residual method. Some studies empirically
investigate the determinants of capital flight using the hot money method. In several
cases, estimations are presented using different kinds of measures for capital flight to
show the sensitivity of the estimation results to the specific measure used. In general,
the table shows that estimation results differ, depending on the measure of capital flight
used. This indicates the crucial importance of the issue of measurement of the capital
flight phenomenon.
The studies summarized in Table 3 focus on developing countries. The Table shows that
most studies focus on capital flight of Latin American countries. Only a few have
focused on African countries. The emphasis on Latin America is due to the massive
outflows these countries experienced during the 1980s following the debt crisis. As was
shown in section 3, in absolute terms capital flight of these countries, at least during the
1980s, was by far the largest. However, the relative burden of capital flight during this
decade was higher for countries in Sub-Sahara Africa, emphasizing the need for
research with respect to the determinants of capital flight from this continent. In a
number of cases estimations have been carried out using individual country data. This
particularly holds for early attempts to investigate the capital flight phenomenon. More
recently, two studies have investigated the determinants of capital flight using a large
sample of developing countries (Lensink et al. 2000; Hermes and Lensink 2001).Table 3





technique Main determinants tested
Cuddington
(1986)
Hot money Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Korea, Mexico,
Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela
1974-82 OLS REER (+/–), FINC, RINTR, RINTRF, INFL (+)
Cuddington
(1987)
Hot money Argentina, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela 1974-84 OLS REER (+), RINTRF, INFL
Dooley
(1988)
Dooley Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru,
Philippines and Venezuela
1977-84 OLS (pooled) with
instruments








Residual Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico,
Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela











Mexico 1976-85 OLS E (FINC) (+),  RINTR, DUMG (+)
Hermes and Lensink
(1992)
Residual and asset Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania,
Uganda and Zaire












Residual Philippines 1962-86 OLS DEBTGDP (+), RINTR (+), BUDDEF (+), YG
Henry
(1996)
Residual Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and
Tobago




Residual Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania,
Uganda and Zaire














technique Main determinants tested
Hermes et al.
(1999)






84 LDCs 1971-90 EBA and CDF BANKL (+), AIDGDP (+), FDI, PINSTAB, WAR,
CIVLIB (+), PRIGHTS, PARCOM (+)
Ng’eno
(2000)
Residual Kenya 1981-95 OLS YG, RINTR, REER
Nyoni
(2000)
Residual Tanzania 1973-92 OLS YG, INFL, FINC, POLRISK
Olopoenia
(2000)
Residual Uganda 1971-94 OLS YG, INFL, FINC
Collier et al.
(2001)
Residual 39 LDCs 1970-90 LAD DEBTGNP (+), REER (+), CFS (+)
Hermes and Lensink
(2001)
Residual 84 LDCs 1971-91 CDF BANKL (+), AIDGDP (+), PINSTAB (+),
CIVLIB (+), EGOVC (+), ETAX (+), EBUD (+),
EINFL (+), ERINTR (+)
Ndikumana and Boyce
(2002)
Residual 30 Sub-Saharan African countries 1970-96 OLS KF-1 (+), KF-2 (+),  DEBGDP (+), DEBST (+),
INFL, BUDDEF (–), FINC, VOICE (–),
FREE (–), CORR (+), GOVEFF, CONT
Notes: In all studies listed in the table the dependent variable is capital flight, measured in different ways, however (see Column [2]).
The estimation techniques mentioned in column [5] are: ordinary least squares (OLS), seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR), quantile regressions using least
absolute deviation estimation (LAD; see Collier et al. 2001), extreme bound analysis (EBA; see Levine and Renelt 1992), and estimation with cumulative distribution
functions (CDF; see Sala-i-Martin 1997).
Column [6], indicating the ‘main determinants tested’, only shows those variables of interest to the study of capital flight and its determinants. In several cases the
specification of the equations estimated also may contain control variables. These variables have been left out of the table. A (+) or (–) behind a variable in this
column indicates that this variable is significantly positive (or negative) related to capital flight, i.e. t-values for this variable are above 1.7 in the majority of the
equations estimated in the studies listed.
For abbreviations of variables used in the table, see Appendix A.    
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In most cases the empirical studies on the determinants of capital flight implicitly use a
portfolio model to decide which variables should be taken into account. Almost all
studies estimate a reduced form equation. Consequently, this leads to equations of a
rather ad hoc nature, which in a way is a shortcoming of the empirical literature on
capital flight. Only Lensink et al. (1998) aim at estimating a full portfolio model, in
which capital flight is taken into account as one of the assets, and which allows for
investigating the simultaneity of different effects between different variables. Most
studies estimating a reduced form equation apply OLS. In some cases the empirical
studies deal with time series, in other cases they use pooled regressions.
As was already mentioned, most cases empirical studies implicitly use a portfolio model
to decide which variables should be taken into account. If we take the different
categories of determinants of capital flight as discussed in the previous section, the
following broad picture emerges.
With respect to macroeconomic instability, one or more variables such as exchange rate
overvaluation, government deficits, the inflation rate, and current account deficits
appear in almost all studies. In particular, measures of the degree of exchange rate
overvaluation are prominently present in these studies. The results of the empirical
investigations indicate that macroeconomic instability causes capital flight. In most
specifications variables measuring the extent of macroeconomic instability are
statistically significant and positively related to capital flight.
Few studies focus on measures of political instability as determinants of capital flight.
Several kinds of measures have been used. In some cases, the empirical investigations
focus on the regime type as measure of political instability, using different dummy
variables that proxy for the degree of democracy of a country. Other studies use dummy
variables to measure issues related to the policy regime, such as indexes of civil rights
and liberties. Still other studies use more direct measures for political instability, such as
the number of assassinations and revolts, dummies for the fact that a country has been
involved in a war situation. In general, the results of the empirical investigations support
the view that political instability, measured in various ways, and capital flight are
positively related.
Proxies of the interest rate differential are used in some studies to measure the relative
attractiveness of domestic as compared to foreign assets. In most cases, researchers have
calculated some kind of exchange rate differential between the domestic interest rate on
deposits and a foreign deposit rate, normally the US deposit rate. Another measure
proxying for the attractiveness of different assets used is the growth rate of GDP or
GNP. Measures of the interest rate differential do not always have a statistically
significant relation to capital flight. This may indicate that other determinants, such as
macroeconomic and political instability, are more important to explain capital flight.
In many studies, capital inflow variables are taken into account. In several cases these
capital flows have been split into one or more forms of inflows. In particular, research
has focused on investigating the impact of long-term versus short-term foreign debt. A
few studies have also investigated the role played by aid flows. Among others, Bauer
(1981) argues that development aid would be used to finance capital flight. The table
shows that especially long-term debt inflows have a statistically significant influence on
capital flight. The hypothesis put forward by Bauer on the relationship between aid and
capital flight is supported in some of the studies surveyed.16
To our knowledge only a few studies focus on the stock of capital flight as a
determinant of capital flight (Collier et al. 2001). This study finds evidence for the
positive relationship between capital flight and the stock of capital flight. Vos (1992)
also finds a positive relationship, which he takes as evidence for his hypothesized stock-
adjustment behaviour based on satisfying foreign consumption needs of residents.
Finally, one recent study has analysed the relationship between public policy uncertainty
and capital flight  by directly focussing on uncertainty with respect to government
consumption expenditures, taxes, budget deficits, inflation and real interest rates
(Hermes and Lensink 2001). The evidence from this study shows that public policy
uncertainty indeed plays an important role in explaining capital flight.
In conclusion, it appears that foreign debt variables, exchange rate overvaluation and
political risk variables do have a statistically significant impact on capital flight in all
empirical studies summarized in Table 3. It should be added, however, that the studies
also show quite diverse outcomes with respect to the determinants of capital flight at the
individual country level. In several cases, other macroeconomic instability variables do
have an impact on capital flight. The table only shows general results found.
5 Conclusions: policies for reversal of capital flight
This paper has examined the key issues in the literature on capital flight, including the
main measurement methods, magnitude and a discussion of its determinants. Our paper
first of all clearly shows that capital flight is still a serious issue. Many developing
countries have suffered from large capital flight during the 1980s and 1990s. The
potential for capital reversals seem to be quite substantial. In 1998, stocks of capital
flight held abroad amounted to over 40 per cent of GDP on average for the Sub-Saharan
African countries in our sample. For the East Asian countries such stocks were even 60
per cent of GDP. Even for the Latin American countries in our sample, capital flight
was still over 20 per cent of GDP in 1998. These figures show that there may be
potentially large resources available for development financing if countries are able to
conduct policies that contribute to the reversal of capital flight.
The review of the theoretical and empirical literature on the determinants of capital
flight provided insights into the factors that may possibly contribute to the return of
capital flight. Based upon the insights from the review, we come to the following main
conclusions about policies that may help to reverse capital flight in the near future.
5.1 Macroeconomic stability
Policymakers have to recognize the need for macroeconomic stability in order to stem
continued capital flight and induce capital flight reversal. As discussed, the causes of
this instability may be manifold, for example political tensions and instability, wrong or
lacking incentive structures and institutions to let markets efficiently coordinate demand
and supply, and heavy government involvement, which may put markets at the sideline.
Whatever the exact reasons, when a country experiences macroeconomic instability this
may become manifest in a number of ways: budget deficits will rise, current account
deficits increase, exchange rate overvaluation occurs and inflation is growing.17
In all these cases, macroeconomic instability leads to (indirectly) increasing taxes and
tax-like distortions. This lowers returns and increases risk and uncertainty of
domestically held wealth and increases incentives for capital flight. The large outflows
of capital at the beginning of the debt crisis in the early 1980s and at the outbreak of the
Asian crisis in 1997-98, when the macroeconomic fundamental in these countries were
highly unstable, support this view.
In this context, it is necessary to adopt an appropriate exchange rate and positive real
interest rates, as well as pay attention to budget deficits in order to increase the
prospects for the reversal of capital flight. Reducing macroeconomic instability and
carrying out sound macroeconomic policies will also reduce the uncertainty with respect
to government policies.
5.2 Political stability
Policymakers also have to look at the institutional context in which good
macroeconomic policies have been carried out. As we have seen, the institutional
context itself may give rise to capital flight. Public sector behaviour may have an impact
on the risks and uncertainty regarding the policy environment and its outcomes. More
specifically, residents may decide to hold their assets abroad based on a lack of
confidence in the domestic political situation and its consequences for the future value
of their assets.Hence, political stability is important in order to stem continued capital
flight and induce capital flight reversal.
5.3 Rate of return differentials
Consistent with economic theory and the empirical studies, capital flight may occur
simply because the returns on assets are higher abroad as compared to assets held
domestically. Indeed, most studies on the determinants of capital flight take this into
account by adding a variable that measures the (after tax) real interest rate differential.
In order to stem continued capital flight and induce capital flight reversal, policymakers
have to pay attention not only to maintaining positive real interest rates but to ensure a
competitive interest rate and to capture the covered and uncovered parity conditions.
Yet, our review of the empirical evidence also showed that, in general, interest rate
differentials were a less important determinant of capital flight. Therefore, maintaining
a positive interest rate differential may be a necessary but not sufficient condition to
secure capital reversals. For reversals to occur, macroeconomic and political stability
seem to be more important.
5.4 Capital inflows
As was discussed in section 4.4, capital flows may be an important determinant of
capital flight, mainly because high inflows may signal future payment problems for the
government. If residents perceive that the government will pass the costs of these
repayments to them, for example by using the inflation tax, they may choose to convert
their domestic assets into foreign assets. Moreover, the occurrence of capital flight itself
stimulates agents to hold money abroad, since the future costs of debt repayment by the
government have to be shared by a decreasing number of wealth holders. In this context,
policymakers need to pay attention to external debt management. The empirical18
evidence is clear about the importance of the adverse incentives of large external debts
on investment decisions of domestic wealth holders. For this matter, the international
financial community may be advised to consider providing debt relief in a number of
individual country cases. In the case of several Sub-Saharan African countries, for
example, debt relief can have a strong positive effect on increasing resources available
for policy reform: it reduces debt payment obligations, while at the same time it
stimulates capital flight reversals.
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Appendix Table A-1










East Asia Latin America
China 1983-89 4,827 1.9 Argentina 1983-89 952 1.3
1990-98 64,493 10.2 1990-98 7,056 3.3
Fiji 1983-89 33 3.0 Barbados 1983-89 70 5.6
1990-98 -33 -1.9 1990-98 70 4.0
Indonesia 1983-89 2,864 3.4 Bolivia 1983-89 -151 -0.8
1990-98 9,389 6.7 1990-98 241 2.8
Korea 1983-89 5,989 4.0 Brazil 1983-89 3,719 1.4
1990-98 11,323 3.2 1990-98 12,667 2.5
Papua New Guinea 1983-89 -5 0.2 Chile 1983-89 -323 -1.7
1990-98 402 8.9 1990-98 3,081 6.1
Philippines 1983-89 115 0.6 Colombia 1983-89 665 1.6
1990-98 1,978 3.3 1990-98 1,412 2.5
Samoa 1983-89 16 15.4 Costa Rica 1983-89 78 2.3
1990-98 8 3.1 1990-98 -32 -1.0
Solomon Islands 1983-89 -2 -0.01 El Salvador 1983-89 146 3.9
1990-98 14 4.7 1990-98 329 2.9
Thailand 1983-89 2,061 3.5 Jamaica 1983-89 122 4.8
1990-98 5,335 4.6 1990-98 15 0.3
Nicaragua 1983-89 369 18.9
1990-98 -847 -41.5
Paraguay 1983-89 44 1.1
1990-98 -65 -1.2
Venezuela 1983-89 40 -0.7
1990-98 5,068 7.9
South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa
Bangladesh 1983-89 164 0.9 Botswana 1983-89 635 32.0
1990-98 -160 -0.2 1990-98 651 15.4
Bhutan 1983-89 -74 -33.8 Cameroon 1983-89 480 4.6
1990-98 -13 -4.5 1990-98 460 4.9
India 1983-89 2,694 1.1 Côte d’Ivoire 1983-89 296 3.0
1990-98 2,555 0.9 1990-98 -346 -3.9
Pakistan 1983-89 2,761 0.9 Ethiopia 1983-89 268 4.0
1990-98 -282 -0.2 1990-98 -13 -0.1
Sri Lanka 1983-89 46 0.7 Kenya 1983-89 153 2.5
1990-98 286 2.8 1990-98 32 1.3
Mauritania 1983-89 -16 -1.7
1990-98 61 5.6
Mauritius 1983-89 134 7.3
1990-98 193 5.4
Mozambique 1983-89 242 4.9
1990-98 15 1.3
Swaziland 1983-89 50 7.5
1990-98 43 4.2
Uganda 1983-89 57 1.4
1990-98 -139 -3.3
Note: CF is capital flight; CF/GDP is the average level of CF/GDP over the entire period.23
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Appendix A: list of abbreviations and variables used in modelling
the determinants of capital flight
∆  change in a variable
AIDGDP development aid as a percentage of GDP
BANKL  bank and trade related lending as a percentage of GDP
BUDDEF  overall budget deficits, including grants as a percentage of GDP
CFS  stock of capital flight
CIVLIB  index measuring civil liberties
CONT  measure of risk of contract repudiation
CORR  index measuring the extent of corruption
CREDITPR credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP
DEBTGDP  the external debt to GDP ratio
DEBTS  total external debt service as a percentage of GDP
DEBST  total stock of external debt service as a percentage of GDP
DUMG  dummy variable for regime change
E(.) expected value of a variable
EBUD  uncertainty with respect to government budget deficit
EGOVC  uncertainty with respect to government consumption expenditures
EINFL uncertainty with respect to inflation
ERINTR  uncertainty with respect to real interest rate
ETAX  uncertainty with respect to taxes
FDI  foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP
FINC  difference between domestic and foreign interest rate corrected for
changes in the exchange rate
FREE  measure of political freedom
GOVEFF  measure of government effectiveness
INFL  annual domestic inflation rate
KF-1  capital flight one period lagged
KF-2  capital flight two periods lagged
LDCs developing countries
PARCOM  extent to which non-elites are able to access institutional structures for
political expression
PINSTAB  measure of political instability, calculated as 0.5 times the number of
assassinations per million population per year plus 0.5 times the number
of revolutions per year
POLRISK measure of political risk24
PR  political risk variable (specified in Dooley 1986)
PRIGHTS  index of political rights
REER  real (effective) exchange rate
RINTR  real interest rate (%)
RINTRF  foreign real interest rate (%)
SHDGDP  short term debt to GDP ratio
SPREAD  interest rate spread (i.e. foreign minus domestic real interest rate)
TAXGDP  total taxes as a percentage of GDP
VOICE  measure of voice and accountability
WAR dummy variable (1 = country participated in at least one external war
during 1960-1985; 0 = no participation in external wars)
YG  rate of domestic economic growth1